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Abstract:  This article examines the role of commercial real estate investments in the banking 
crisis of 1985-92, an unprecedented period during which more than 1,300 banks failed.  Bank 
failures are fundamentally important because of the unique role played by financial institutions 
in the provision of business credit.  We discover three striking features of banks failing during 
this period.  First, commercial real estate was only a factor in the bank failures of 1988-92.  
Second, construction loans played a much larger role in bank failures than permanent loans, and 
the relationship is strongest with construction loans booked during 1983-1985.  Third, other ex 
ante risk measures are systematically related to banking failure throughout the sample period.  
These results suggest that risk-seeking banks brought about their own demise and commercial 
real estate, especially construction lending, was one of the vehicles. 
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The Role of Commercial Real Estate Investments in the 
Banking Crisis of 1985-1992 
 
1. Introduction 
Commercial real estate lending by U.S. commercial banks grew by almost 200% between 
1981 and 1992 to more than $400 billion.  This growth was part of an economy-wide boom in 
commercial mortgage credit that began following the recessions of 1980-82 and fueled in large 
part by declining interest rates and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which greatly 
increased the after-tax profitability of commercial real estate investments (see Fergus and 
Goodman 1994).  From 1981 to 1992, nonresidential mortgage credit from all types of 
institutions increased from approximately $500 billion to more than $1 trillion (U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development).  Curiously, this growth continued, albeit at a slower pace, 
even after Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which dramatically curtailed most of 
the tax benefits associated with owning commercial real estate.  The end result of this boom was 
a massive oversupply of commercial real estate that would not be effectively absorbed until the 
mid-1990s.   
In response to the growing oversupply of commercial properties, real estate prices 
plummeted.  As measured by the Russell-NCREIF Property Index, prices peaked in 1985, fell 3 
percent by year-end 1989, and declined a startling 32 percent during 1990-92.  A decline of this 
magnitude suggests that even well-underwritten loans inflicted losses on investors, including 
commercial bank and thrift lenders.  In fact, more than 2,000 banks and thrifts failed from 1981-
92, and the preponderance of anecdotal evidence suggests that losses on commercial real estate 
loans played a major role in these failures.  While researchers have analyzed the role of 
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commercial real estate in the failure of thrift institutions (Cole 1993; Cole, McKenzie, and White 
1995; and Cole and Eisenbeis 1996), the role of commercial real estate in the failure of 
commercial banks has been addressed in only a cursory manner (Randall 1993; Cole and 
Gunther 1995).  It is the purpose of this paper to provide a rigorous and in-depth analysis of the 
role of commercial real estate investments in the failure of more than 1,300 banks during the 
1985-92 period.  Only during the Great Depression of the 1930s did more banks fail during a 
comparable period of time. 
We wish to study the effect of commercial real estate investment on bank failure rather 
than on alternative measures of bank performance (such as the provisions of credit, capital 
adequacy or profitability) because of the unique role that banks play in the provision of credit.1  
According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), problems of asymmetric information between a 
borrower and potential creditor can impede the flow of capital to profitable firms.  Financial 
institutions (including banks and thrifts) have an important advantage in mitigating this problem 
of asymmetric information.  By monitoring interactions with a firm obtaining its financial 
services, a financial institution develops valuable private information about the firm’s financial 
prospects useful for deciding whether or not to grant credit (Diamond 1984).  This role is most 
prominent for banks because far more firms obtain financial services (such as checking and 
                                                 
     1  Previous research has focused on how real estate loans and capital constraints have affected 
the provision of bank credit to borrowers, but has not analyzed how real estate loans affect bank 
performance.  For example, Peak and Rosengren (1994) and Hancock and Wilcox (1994b) 
analyze the effect of commercial real estate loans on the provision of bank credit in 1990 for a 
sample of New England banks and a sample of banks with more than $300 million in total assets, 
respectively.  Hancock and Wilcox (1994a) analyze the effect of capital shortfalls, loan 
delinquencies, and local economic conditions on the provision of real estate credit.  None of 
these studies address how real estate investments may have contributed to bank failures. 
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savings accounts) from commercial banks than from any other source of financial services.  
Given this special role for banks, it is critically important to understand the factors that lead to 
failure because the valuable private information a bank has generated about its customers is lost 
in the event of failure.  Such is not the case when a bank restricts the provision of credit, loses 
money, or lacks capital. 
There is little reason to question that high concentrations of commercial real estate loans 
were associated with banks that failed and that these loans contributed significantly to the failed 
banks' losses.  Throughout the 1980s, both the percentage of bank assets invested in commercial 
mortgages and the percentage of commercial mortgages owned by banks increased steadily 
(Hester 1992; Fergus and Goodman 1994).  Randall (1993) examines financial data of 87 New 
England banks that failed between 1989 and 1992 and finds that cumulative write-offs and 
non-performing assets were primarily attributable to real estate loans in 83 of the 87 cases.  Cole 
and Gunther (1995) use 1985 financial data to analyze banks failing or surviving from 1986 to 
1992 and find that commercial real estate loans are negatively related to the likelihood of 
survival but unrelated to the expected survival time. 
Because they do not formally analyze the relationship between commercial real estate 
loans and bank failures or do so in only a cursory manner, the studies cited above, and many 
others like them, leave unanswered many important questions.  A central issue is whether 
commercial real estate loans are inherently riskier than other types of bank investments or a 
combination of tax law changes and sloppy loan underwriting led to anomolous and precipitous 
losses on commercial real estate investments.  Did all commercial real estate loans contribute to 
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bank failures or only certain types?  Was the critical factor related to bank failure the quantity, or 
quality, of the commercial real estate loans? 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between commercial real estate investments 
and bank failure in a way that allows us to address these questions.  Our approach is to estimate 
the cross-sectional relationship between bank failure and asset concentrations in commercial real 
estate and other types of loans.  There are several distinctive features of our analysis that permit 
us to investigate these issues.  First, we disaggregate failures by year, which enables us to 
examine how the effect of commercial real estate investments on bank failures varied over time.  
Second, we disaggregate commercial real estate into different types of investments—
construction loans, multi-family mortgages, and nonresidential commercial mortgages.  Third, 
we utilize lagged values of construction loans to further differentiate permanent loans that were 
originated as construction loans from those that were not.  Fourth, we include additional balance 
sheet and income statement measures to control for differences in banks' preference for 
risk-taking.  To the extent that these measures are better proxies for bank risk-taking than 
commercial real estate, these regressions will isolate the contribution of commercial real estate 
risk to the likelihood of failure as distinct from its signaling value.  And fifth, we conduct 
separate analyses of banks in the Southwest —the region hardest hit by the commercial real 
estate crash.  This enables us to control for regional effects, such as the oil price shock, that 
contributed to bank failures. 
Utilizing this approach, we discover three striking features of bank failures occurring 
during 1985-1992.  First, commercial real estate was not a factor in the banking failures of 
1985-86 despite the increase in commercial real estate lending that began in 1982.  Commercial 
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real estate became a factor in banking failures beginning in 1987 and was strongly connected to 
bank failures occurring during 1988-1992.  This suggests that commercial real estate loans are 
not inherently riskier than other types of bank investments. 
Second, the distinction between construction lending and permanent financing is 
extremely important and has an interesting temporal dimension.  Throughout 1988-1992, 
construction loans play a much larger role in bank failures than permanent loans, and the 
relationship is strongest with construction loans recorded during 1983-1985.   
Third, other ex ante risk measures are systematically related to banking failure 
throughout the sample period, but do not eliminate the influence of commercial real estate 
investments on bank failures.  Specifically, higher than average ratios of loans to assets, jumbo 
CDs to assets, and noninterest expense to assets all are associated with higher probabilities of 
failure. 
When we analyze only those banks located in the Southwest, our results are not 
qualitatively different from those for the nation.  This finding eliminates the possibility that the 
rolling regional recessions of the 1980s are responsible for our national results regarding the role 
of construction loans booked during the early 1980s. 
Although these results affirm that, from 1987 on, banking failures were strongly associated with 
commercial real estate, they convey a different impression of the relationship than offered by 
some accounts of the period.  Our results suggest that commercial real estate did not bring down 
the banks; rather risk-preferent banks brought themselves down and commercial real estate, 
especially construction lending, was one of the vehicles. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we provide an 
overview of real estate lending by commercial banks and bank failures during 1981-1992.  In 
section 3, we discuss our data and methodology, followed by results in section 4 and summary 
and conclusions in section 5. 
 
2. Real Estate Lending by Commercial Banks and Bank Failures 
Between year-end 1981 and year-end 1993, commercial real estate loans at commercial 
banks increased by a factor of three from $136 billion to $406 billion (table 1).  As a percentage 
of total bank assets, these loans increased from less than 7 percent in 1981 to 11 percent in 1993. 
 In both dollar and percentage terms, commercial real estate loans peaked in 1990 at $429 billion 
or 12.7 percent of bank assets.  In the peak growth period, 1981-90, commercial real estate loans 
at commercial banks increased at an annual compound rate of 15 percent compared to the 5 
percent growth rate of total bank assets. 
Commercial real estate loans encompass three distinct types—permanent loans for 
multifamily structures, permanent loans for nonresidential structures, and loans for land and 
construction.2  As shown in table 1, multifamily mortgages accounted for only a small portion of 
commercial real estate loans throughout this period and actually registered their largest increase 
(42 percent) during the recent 1990-93 credit crunch period.  At their peak in 1993, multifamily 
loans were $30 billion or less than one percent of total bank assets. 
                                                 
     2  As defined in table 1, commercial real estate loans also include real estate loans to foreign 
domiciled borrowers and loans for farmland.  These two types of commercial loans, however, are 
rarely mentioned as contributing to the problems experienced in the banking or commercial real 
estate industries.  Moreover, both are relatively small in magnitude (less than one percent of total 
bank assets).  Consequently, they are not analyzed in detail here. 
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Nonresidential mortgages increased four-fold from 1981 to 1993, growing from $67 
billion or 3.3 percent of bank assets to $267 billion or 7.2 percent of bank assets.  These loans on 
already-built office buildings, hotels, retail store space, and industrial buildings doubled in 
volume from 1981 to 1986, and doubled again from 1986 to 1993. 
Land and construction loans also increased rapidly from 1981 to 1986, more than 
doubling from $45 billion or 2.2 percent of bank assets to $107 billion or 3.6 percent of bank 
assets.  These loans continued to increase, albeit at a slower pace, through 1989 to reach a peak 
of $136 billion or 4.1 percent of bank assets.  From 1990 to 1993, however, land and 
construction loans plummeted 50 percent to $66 billion or 1.8 percent of assets, accounting for 
much of the slowdown in total commercial real estate loan growth.   
Commercial bank failures throughout the 1982-93 period were at their highest levels 
since the 1930s.  During the forty-year period from 1941-1981, no more than 16 commercial 
banks failed in any single year.  By contrast, during the next twelve years, there were at least 40 
failures per year, and during the 1985-1992 period, more than 100 banks failed each year (Figure 
1).  Not until 1993, when only 41 banks were closed, did the number of failures drop to pre-1985 
levels.  Also, shown in Figure 1 is the concentration of bank failures in the Southwest, here 
defined as the 11th Federal Reserve District.  Southwestern banks accounted for at least one 
fourth of all U.S. bank failures in each year from 1987-92, and more than half of the failures in 
peak failure years of 1988-90. 
 
3. Methodology 
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We analyze the relationship between commercial real estate lending and bank failure 
using both univariate and multivariate methods.  Our first step is to identify whether commercial 
real estate loans and bank failures are related at the bank-level.  In this step, we form two 
portfolios of banks for each year—banks failing during that year and banks surviving through 
that year—and then perform t-tests on the differences in the mean values of commercial real 
estate loan concentrations for each year. 
The second step in our analysis is designed to differentiate between several hypotheses 
regarding the relationship between commercial real estate loans and bank failures.  We model 
bank failure as a function of commercial real estate loan concentration variables and a set of 
control variables.  Because our dependent variable is binary (fail or survive), the use of ordinary-
least-squares regression is inappropriate (see Maddala 1983, pp. 15-16).  Instead, we utilize the 
multivariate logistic regression model.  In this model, we assume Failure*it is an unobservable 
index of the probability that bank i fails during year t and is a function of bank-specific 
characteristics xit, so that: 
Failure*it   =   βt _ xit   + μit   (1) 
where xit  is a vector of commercial real estate loan concentration and control variables, βt is a 
vector of parameter estimates for the independent variables, μit  is a random disturbance term, i = 
1, 2, . . . , N, where N is the number of banks in year t, and t = 1985, 1986, . . . , 1992.  
Let Failureit be an observable variable that equal to one if Failure*it > 0 and zero if Failure*it ≤ 
0. In this particular application, Failureit is equal to one if a bank fails during year t and zero 
otherwise. Since Failure*it is equal to βt _ xit  +μit, the probability that Failureit > 0 is equal to 
the probability that βt _ xit > 0, or, equivalently, the probability that (μit > - βt _ xit).  Therefore, 
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one can write the probability that Failureit is equal to one as as the probability that (μit > - βt _ xit) 
, or, equivalently, that Prob(Failureit = 1) = 1 - Φ (-βt _ xit), where Φ is the cumulative 
distribution function of ε, here assumed to be logistic.  The probability that Failureit is equal to 
zero is then simply Φ (-βt _ xit).  The likelihood function L for this model is: 
L   =   Π  [Φ (-βt _ xit)]   Π  [1 - Φ (-βt _ xit)] 
                          Failureit = 0                             Failureit = 1 
where: 
Φ (-βt _ xit) = exp(-βt _ xit)  /  [1 - exp(-βt _ xit)] = 1  /  [1 + exp(-βt _ xit)] 
and  
1 - Φ (-βt _ xit) = exp(-βt _ xit)  /  [1 +(-βt _ xit)].   
The specific hypotheses we test are: 
Hypothesis 1:  Different types of commercial real estate investments have differing 
impact on the probability of bank failure.  We speculate that the characteristics of construction 
loans are such that they resulted in greater losses than other types of loans, disproportionately 
contributing to the likelihood of failure.  To examine this hypothesis, we estimate the probability 
of failure during year t using contemporaneous values of multifamily, nonresidential, and 
construction real estate loans included in x, where contemporaneous is defined as December 31 
of year  t-1.   
Hypothesis 2: Construction loans originated prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which 
reduced or eliminated many of the tax advantages associated with such loans, imposes even 
greater losses than construction loans made after the provisions of that Act became law.  To test 
this hypothesis, we estimate the probability of failure for each year using lagged values of 
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construction loans in order to identify whether construction loans originated during earlier 
periods but migrating to the permanent loan or foreclosed real estate categories (or being written 
off as losses) are strongly related to bank failures. 
Hypothesis 3:  Controlling for other measures of bank risk-taking alters the relationship 
between bank failures and commercial real estate investments.  Commercial real estate loans 
could be positively related to bank failure either because of loan losses attributable to the crash 
in the commercial real estate market (i.e., because of a “bad” outcome), or because such loans 
serve as a proxy for bank management’s preference for risk-taking.  If the former is 
predominantly true, the relationship between bank failures and real estate loans should be robust 
to the inclusion of other proxies for a bank's risk-preference, whereas, if the latter is 
predominantly true, the inclusion of other proxies for bank risk should severely diminish the 
explanatory power of the commercial real estate variables.  To examine this hypothesis, we 
estimate the probability of failure as a function of not only the three types of commercial real 
estate but also as a function of five variables measuring management's preference for risk that 
are commonly found in the literature on bank performance.3  These variables are total loans, 
jumbo CDs (CDs greater than $100,000), loans to insiders,  non-interest expense, and residential 
mortgages. Each of these variables is measured as of year-end and is expressed as a percentage 
of total bank assets.  With the exception of residential mortgages, each of these variables 
typically exhibits a positive relationship with bank risk-taking.  We purposely omit other 
potential control variables, including the ratios of equity-to-assets income-to-assets, net charge-
offs-to-assets, non-performing assets-to-total assets, and foreclosed real estate-to-assets, because 
                                                 
     3  See, for example, Thomson (1992) or Cole and Gunther (1995). 
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such variables reflect the outcomes of a bank’s earlier investments.  If real estate investments 
impose losses on a bank’s portfolio, those losses will be reflected through the outcome variables 
rather than the real estate variables. 
 
4. Data 
Our data come from two primary sources.  First, we use FDIC press releases to classify 
each commercial bank as failing or surviving each year during the 1985-1992 period.  In many 
cases, multiple banks associated with one bank holding company failed because of problems at 
the company’s lead bank.  For these cases, we include only the holding company’s lead bank; the 
remainder of the holding company’s failing subsidiaries are deleted.  After these deletions, the 
number of failing banks in our sample ranges from a low of 110 in 1985 and 1992 to a high of 
203 in 1988.  The number of surviving banks ranges from a low of 12,221 in 1992 to a high of 
14,367 in 1985. 
Second, we obtain balance sheet, income statement, and structure data for each bank in 
each year during the 1981-1992 period from the quarterly Reports of Income and Condition filed 
by commercial banks with their primary regulator and compiled by the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).  Our final sample consists of all FDIC-insured 
commercial banks that filed a year-end call report for any year during the 1985-1992 period.   
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5. Results 
5.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 presents univariate statistics by year for the portfolios of failing and surviving 
banks. For each portfolio in each year during the 1985-1992 period, the table presents the mean 
and standard error for each explanatory variable along with the results of t-tests for significant 
differences in the means of the failing and surviving portfolios.   
 This analysis reveals that failing banks held significantly higher concentrations of 
commercial real estate loans in 1988-1992, with the difference in means ranging from 3.58 
percentage points in 1988 to a peak of 9.55 percentage points (18.75 percent for failing banks as 
compared with 9.20 percent for surviving banks) in 1991.  Examination of the three components 
of commercial real estate loans—multifamily, construction, and permanent nonresidential—
reveals that there also were significant differences in the means for permanent nonresidential 
loans for each year from 1988-1992, peaking at 7.04 percentage points for the 1991 portfolio.  
The differences in the means of construction loans were significant for 1988-1989 and 1991-
1992, but the differences in the means of multifamily mortgages were significant only for 1991-
1992.  Thus, on the basis of univariate analysis, it would appear that permanent nonresidential 
mortgages were more significant in explaining bank failures than either construction or 
multifamily mortgages. 
Also in table 2 are univariate results for the five variables that we use as controls to 
differentiate banks with high risk preferences—the ratios of residential mortgages, total loans, 
jumbo CDs, insider loans, and noninterest expenses to total assets.  We note that failing banks 
typically had higher ratios of each of these variables (except residential mortgages, for which 
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failing banks had lower ratios) than did surviving banks, and that differences in the mean values 
for the surviving and failing banks are statistically significant in at least four of the eight years 
analyzed.  For two of these variables—the ratios of total loans and noninterest expense to 
assets—failing banks had higher means that were statistically different from those of surviving 
banks in all eight years; and for two more—jumbo CDs and insider loans—failing banks had 
higher means that were statistically different from those of surviving banks in seven of eight 
years. 
 
5.2 Results of Multivariate Analysis 
The multivariate logistic regression results for each year from 1985 to 1992 are reported 
in table 3.  For each year, regression estimates for three specifications of eq. (1) are reported.  In 
the first column, only contemporaneous commercial real estate variables—nonresidential 
mortgages, construction loans, and multifamily mortgages—and dummy variables indicating 
banks located in the Southwest and New England are included as explanatory variables.4  In the 
second column, the contemporaneous value of construction loans is replaced by the optimal 
lagged value, where the optimal value is defined as the one that maximizes the F-statistic of the 
regression.  To determine the optimal lag, the contemporaneous value of construction loans and 
each lagged value back to 1981 were included in the regression sequentially along with the 
contemporaneous values of multifamily and permanent nonresidential mortgages.  In the third 
column for each year are regression results for the full specification of eq. (1) including the 
                                                 
     4  The New England region is defined as the First (Boston) and Second (New York) Federal 
Reserve Bank Districts.  As noted earlier, the Soutwest region is defined as the Eleventh (Dallas) 
Federal Reserve District. 
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optimal lagged value of construction loans and contemporaneous values of permanent 
nonresidential mortgages, multifamily mortgages, and the five control variables for bank 
risk-taking. 
Examining first the column 1 results for each year, we see that commercial real estate 
loans are essentially unrelated to bank failures in 1985 and 1986 and that only construction loans 
are significantly related to bank failures in 1987.  Beginning in 1988, the coefficients on both 
construction loans and nonresidential loans are highly significant; however, in each year the 
relationship as measured by both the size and the t-statistics of the coefficients is strongest for 
nonresidential loans. 
The primacy of nonresidential loans is sharply reversed when lagged construction loans 
replace contemporaneous construction loans as shown in column 2.  The first thing to note about 
these regressions is the marked increase in the overall explanatory power of the models as 
evidenced by the pseudo-R2 goodness-of-fit statistics, which appear at the bottom of table 3.  For 
the 1986-1990 regressions, the goodness-of-fit is more than doubled when lagged construction 
loans replace contemporanous construction loans. 
The second thing to note about these regressions is that the optimal explanatory power of 
construction loans occurs at a lag of three to six years.  For example, for banks failing during 
1985, the optimal lagged value of construction loans was from year-end 1981; for 1986 and 1987 
failures, the optimal lagged value was from 1983; for 1988 and 1989 failures it was from 1984; 
and for 1991 and 1992 it was from 1985.  This suggests that to properly understand the 
contribution of construction loans and permanent financing to bank failures, it is important to 
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capture the influence of loans that are originated as construction loans but that are later 
reclassified as permanent loans—so-called mini-perm loans. 
Also significant is our finding that the optimal lag for the construction loan variable (with 
the exception of the 1985 regressions) falls within a narrow three-year band, 1983-1985.  This 
was a period of robust development lending, but more importantly, it was a period when a great 
deal of commercial real estate development was driven by the value of tax benefits that 
subsequently were reduced or eliminated by the 1986 Tax Reform Act.  These results suggest 
that both the type and vintage of commercial real loans are related to bank failure.  Finally, these 
results demonstrate that construction loans played a much larger role in bank failures than 
permanent financing, particularly in the peak failure years of 1987-1989. 
The third set of results for each year includes five control variables for bank risk-taking.  
Four of these variables are traditional measures of bank risk-taking and are expected to be 
positively related to bank failure, as they were found to be in the univariate analysis.  The fifth 
variable—residential mortgages as a percentage of  total assets—is hypothesized to be 
negatively related to bank risk-taking.  In a stable or declining interest rate environment, such at 
that which characterized the 1985-1992 period, a bank's residential mortgage portfolio consists a 
set of relatively low margin and well-diversified, i.e., low-risk, investments, so it is expected to 
be negatively related to failure.  Inclusion of the residential mortgage variable in the analysis 
also is of interest because of the large increase in bank holdings of residential mortgage loans 
that coincided with the buildup of commercial mortgages during the analysis period.  
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In every year, the control variables have the predicted signs5 and as a group significantly 
increase the explanatory power of the regressions as measured by the pseudo-R2.  The control 
variables enter most strongly in 1985-1987, and, after controlling for these measures of bank 
risk-taking, commercial real estate has little additional explanatory power.  This confirms 
popular wisdom that, until the late 1980s, commercial real estate had little to do with the rising 
number of bank failures, and, to the extent that commercial real estate loans were positively 
associated with bank failures, they mainly served as a proxy for a bank's preference for 
risk-taking.  From 1988-1992, commercial real estate loans are significantly related to bank 
failures, even after controlling for other measures of bank risk.   Accounting for these control 
variables, however, strengthens the evidence suggesting that construction loans played a far 
larger role in bank failures than did permanent loans.  In each regression for 1988-1992, 
inclusion of the control variables significantly weakens the relationship between bank failures 
and permanent nonresidential mortgages, and, to a lesser extent, between bank failures and 
construction loans.  After their inclusion, the significance level of the construction loans variable 
exceeds that of the nonresidential loan variable in 1988-1990 and 1992. 
 
                                                 
     5  The only two exceptions are the negative but insignificant coefficients of jumbo CDs in 
1991 and insider loans in 1992. 
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
In this study, we test the relationship between commercial real estate loan concentration 
and bank failure during the 1985-1992 period.  We find that commercial real estate loan 
concentration was not a factor in the banking failures of 1985-87, despite the increase in 
commercial real estate lending that began in 1982.  High concentrations of commercial real 
estate loans were, however, strongly connected to the bank failures that occurred during 1988-
1992.  For this period, the distinction between construction lending and permanent nonresidential 
financing is extremely important and has an interesting temporal dimension.  Throughout this 
period, construction loan concentration played a much larger role in bank failure than permanent 
nonresidential loan concentration, and the relationship is strongest with construction lending that 
was booked for the 1983-1985 period that preceded  the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which 
significantly and adversely affected commercial real estate investments.  The significance of the 
relationship between bank failures and construction loan concentration suggests that construction 
loans were significantly more risky than other types of commercial real estate investments. 
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Table 1 
Real estate loans outstanding at U.S. commerical banks as of year-ends 1981-1993. 
 
 
 
1981 
 
1982 
 
1983 
 
1984 
 
1985 
 
1986 
 
1987 
 
1988 
 
1989 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
Total commercial 
real estate loans a 
 
$136 
(6.7%) 
 
$149 
(6.8%) 
 
$178 
(7.5%) 
 
$205 
(8.2%) 
 
$239 
(8.8%) 
 
$293 
(10.0%) 
 
$337 
(11.2%) 
 
$372 
(11.9%) 
 
$411 
(12.5%) 
 
$429 
(12.7%) 
 
$420 
(12.3%) 
 
$403 
(11.5%) 
 
$406 
(11.0%) 
 
Multifamily 
mortgages b 
 
$7 
(0.3%) 
 
$8 
(0.4%) 
 
$14 
(0.6%) 
 
$11 
(0.4%) 
 
$13 
(0.4%) 
 
$16 
(0.5%) 
 
$18 
(0.6%) 
 
$18 
(0.6%) 
 
$20 
(0.6%) 
 
$21 
(0.6%) 
 
$24 
(0.7%) 
 
$27 
(0.8%) 
 
$30 
(0.8%) 
 
Nonresidential 
mortgages 
 
$67 
(3.3%) 
 
$72 
(3.3%) 
 
$85 
(3.6%) 
 
$96 
(3.8%) 
 
$113 
(4.2%) 
 
$140 
(4.8%) 
 
$168 
(5.6%) 
 
$189 
(6.0%) 
 
$215 
(6.5%) 
 
$238 
(7.0%) 
 
$249 
(7.3%) 
 
$257 
(7.3%) 
 
$267 
(7.2%) 
 
Loans for land  
and construction 
 
$45 
(2.2%) 
 
$52 
(2.4%) 
 
$61 
(2.6%) 
 
$76 
(3.0%) 
 
$89 
(3.3%) 
 
$107 
(3.6%) 
 
$120 
(4.0%) 
 
$128 
(4.1%) 
 
$136 
(4.1%) 
 
$126 
(3.7%) 
 
$103 
(3.0%) 
 
$79 
(2.3%) 
 
$66 
(1.8%) 
 
Foreign c 
real estate loans 
 
$9 
(0.4%) 
 
$9 
(0.4%) 
 
$9 
(0.4%) 
 
$12 
(0.5%) 
 
$13 
(0.5%) 
 
$17 
(0.6%) 
 
$17 
(0.6%) 
 
$22 
(0.7%) 
 
$23 
(0.7%) 
 
$27 
(0.8%) 
 
$25 
(0.7%) 
 
$20 
(0.6%) 
 
$22 
(0.6%) 
 
Farmland  
mortgages 
 
$8 
(0.4%) 
 
$8 
(0.4%) 
 
$9 
(0.4%) 
 
$10 
(0.4%) 
 
$11 
(0.4%) 
 
$13 
(0.4%) 
 
$14 
(0.5%) 
 
$16 
(0.5%) 
 
$17 
(0.5%) 
 
$17 
(0.5%) 
 
$19 
(0.6%) 
 
$20 
(0.6%) 
 
$21 
(0.6%) 
 
Residential 
mortgages d 
 
$155 
(7.6%) 
 
$159 
(7.3%) 
 
$179 
(7.5%) 
 
$181 
(7.2%) 
 
$199 
(7.3%) 
 
$222 
(7.6%) 
 
$263 
(8.8%) 
 
$302 
(9.6%) 
 
$351 
(10.6%) 
 
$400 
(11.8%) 
 
$429 
(12.5%) 
 
$462 
(13.2%) 
 
$511 
(13.8%) 
 
Total real 
estate loans 
 
$292 
(14.3%) 
 
$308 
(14.0%) 
 
$357 
(15.0%) 
 
$386 
(15.4%) 
 
$438 
(16.1%) 
 
$515 
(17.5%) 
 
$600 
(20.0%) 
 
$675 
(21.6%) 
 
$762 
(23.1%) 
 
$829 
(24.5%) 
 
$849 
(24.8%) 
 
$865 
(24.7%) 
 
$917 
(24.8%) 
 
OREO e 
 
 
$2.6 
(0.1%) 
 
$4.4 
(0.2%) 
 
$5.2 
(0.2%) 
 
$5.9 
(0.2%) 
 
$7.2 
(0.3%) 
 
$9.2 
(0.3%) 
 
$11.0 
(0.4%) 
 
$13.8 
(0.4%) 
 
$21.4 
(0.4%) 
 
$26.0 
(0.8%) 
 
$27.6 
(0.8%) 
 
$26.3 
(0.7%) 
 
$16.8 
(0.5%) 
 
Total loans 
 
$1,121 
(55.0%) 
 
$1,208 
(55.1%) 
 
$1,323 
(55.6%) 
 
$1,508 
(60.1%) 
 
$1,630 
(59.7%) 
 
$1,755 
(59.7%) 
 
$1,829 
(61.0%) 
 
$1,932 
(61.7%) 
 
$2,058 
(62.4%) 
 
$2,045 
(60.4%) 
 
$2,050 
(59.8%) 
 
$2,029 
(57.9%) 
 
$2,143 
(58.0%) 
 
Total asset 
 
$2,039 
(100%) 
 
 
$2,194 
(100%) 
 
$2,381 
(100%) 
 
$2,507 
(100%) 
 
$2,729 
(100%) 
 
$2,937 
(100%) 
 
$2,999 
(100%) 
 
$3,130 
(100%) 
 
$3,299 
(100%) 
 
$3,388 
(100%) 
 
$3,427 
(100%) 
 
$3,501 
(100%) 
 
$3,696 
(100%) 
 
Amounts are billions of dollars.  Percentages of total assets appear in parentheses.  a  Total real estate loans less residential real estate loans.  b  Loans secured by five- or more-family houses.  c  
Loans to foreign-domiciled borrowers, only reported by banks with foreign and domestic offices.  d  Loans secured by one- to four-family houses including home equity loans.  e  OREO, or other real 
estate owned, includes foreclosed real estate and equity real estate held for investment purposes. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for variables examined as determinants of commercial bank failures occurring during 1985-1992 
 
 
 
1985 
 
1986 
 
1987 
 
1988 
 
1989 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
Variable 
 
Surviving 
banks 
 
Failing 
banks 
 
Surviving 
banks 
 
Failing 
banks 
 
Surviving  
banks 
 
Failing 
banks 
 
Surviving 
banks 
 
Failing 
banks 
 
Surviving 
banks 
 
Failing 
banks 
 
Surviving 
banks 
 
Failing 
banks 
 
Surviving 
banks 
 
Failing 
banks 
 
Surviving 
banks 
 
Failing 
banks 
 
Commercial real 
estate loans c 
 
6.63 
(0.05) 
 
5.29 
(0.62) 
 
7.15 
(0.05) 
 
8.42 
(0.74) 
 
7.74 
(0.06) 
 
8.69 
(0.58) 
 
8.34 
(0.07) 
 
11.92 b 
(0.63) 
 
8.60 
(0.07) 
 
13.52 b 
(0.63) 
 
8.93 
(0.07) 
 
14.17 b 
(0.85) 
 
9.20 
(0.08) 
 
18.75 a 
(1.10) 
 
9.53 
(0.08) 
 
16.80 a 
(1.41) 
 
Multifamily 
mortgages  
 
0.37 
(0.01) 
 
0.58 
(0.35) 
 
0.40 
(0.01) 
 
0.57 
(0.12) 
 
0.45 
(0.01) 
 
0.55 
(0.47) 
 
0.48 
(0.01) 
 
1.05 
(0.24) 
 
0.47 
(0.01) 
 
0.65 
(0.09) 
 
0.48 
(0.01) 
 
0.75 
(0.13) 
 
0.53 
(0.01) 
 
1.27 a 
(0.24) 
 
0.59 
(0.01) 
 
1.20 a 
(0.20) 
 
Nonresidential 
mortgages  
 
4.40 
(0.04) 
 
3.41 
(0.40) 
 
4.84 
(0.04) 
 
5.34 
(0.49) 
 
5.38 
(0.04) 
 
5.34 
(0.39) 
 
5.95 
(0.05) 
 
7.87 b 
(0.45) 
 
6.21 
(0.05) 
 
9.73 b 
(0.48) 
 
6.48 
(0.01) 
 
9.94 b 
(0.53) 
 
6.73 
(0.06) 
 
13.77 b 
(0.86) 
 
7.20 
(0.06) 
 
11.91 b 
(1.05) 
 
Loans for land 
and construction 
 
1.86 
(0.03) 
 
1.29 
(0.28) 
 
1.92 
(0.03) 
 
2.50 
(0.34) 
 
1.92 
(0.03) 
 
2.80  
(0.34) 
 
1.91 
(0.03) 
 
3.00 b 
(0.32) 
 
1.91 
(0.03) 
 
3.14 b 
(0.32) 
 
1.97 
(0.03) 
 
3.48  
(0.59) 
 
1.94 
(0.03) 
 
3.72 a 
(0.53) 
 
1.74 
(0.03) 
 
3.68 a 
(0.58) 
 
Residential  
mortgages 
 
10.31 
(0.07) 
 
7.87 b 
(0.62) 
 
10.75 
(0.07) 
 
7.84 b 
(0.51) 
 
11.18 
(0.07) 
 
8.93 b 
(0.47) 
 
12.56 
(0.08) 
 
11.23 
(0.59) 
 
13.20 
(0.09) 
 
11.29 b 
(0.51) 
 
13.67 
(0.09) 
 
12.56 
(0.63) 
 
14.19 
(0.09) 
 
17.13 a 
(1.09) 
 
14.71 
(0.10) 
 
14.63 
(1.22) 
 
Total 
loans 
 
52.83 
(0.12) 
 
66.11 b 
(0.86) 
 
52.50 
(0.12) 
 
65.82 b 
(0.84) 
 
51.03 
(0.13) 
 
63.52 b 
(0.84) 
 
52.12 
(0.14) 
 
60.60 b 
(1.14) 
 
52.79 
(0.14) 
 
60.24 b 
(1.13) 
 
53.23 
(0.14) 
 
60.25 b 
(1.05) 
 
53.25 
(0.14) 
 
66.28 b 
(1.50) 
 
52.51 
(0.14) 
 
61.12 b 
(2.05) 
 
Jumbo  
CDs 
 
10.89 
(0.08) 
 
16.65 b 
(1.31) 
 
11.11 
(0.08) 
 
18.66 b 
(1.23) 
 
10.56 
(0.08) 
 
20.22 b 
(1.06) 
 
10.47 
(0.08) 
 
21.64 b 
(0.95) 
 
10.48 
(0.07) 
 
21.04 b 
(0.86) 
 
10.63 
(0.07) 
 
14.92 b 
(0.64) 
 
10.12 
(0.07) 
 
11.73 
(0.78) 
 
8.77 
(0.06) 
 
11.32 b 
(0.69) 
 
Loans to 
insiders 
 
0.59 
(0.01) 
 
1.07 b 
(0.15) 
 
0.61 
(0.04) 
 
1.47 b 
(0.26) 
 
 0.61 
(0.01) 
 
1.48 b 
(0.17) 
 
0.60 
(0.01) 
 
1.09 b 
(0.12) 
 
0.60 
(0.01) 
 
0.98 b 
(0.11) 
 
0.57 
(0.01) 
 
1.32 b 
(0.16) 
 
0.54 
(0.01) 
 
0.84 a 
(0.11) 
 
0.50 
(0.01) 
 
0.72 
(0.28) 
 
Noninterest 
expense 
 
3.39 
(0.03) 
 
4.35 b 
(0.16) 
 
3.51 
(0.04) 
 
5.01 b 
(0.20) 
 
3.53 
(0.05) 
 
5.86 b 
(0.21) 
 
3.60 
(0.05) 
 
5.40 b 
(0.20) 
 
3.50 
(0.04) 
 
5.85 b 
(0.22) 
 
3.56 
(0.04) 
 
6.63 b 
(0.25) 
 
3.56 
(0.05) 
 
6.38 b 
(0.43) 
 
1.55 
(0.03) 
 
3.35 b 
(0.53) 
 
Number of banks 
 
14,367 
 
110 
 
14,259 
 
135 
 
13,999 
 
195 
 
13,506 
 
203 
 
14,331 
 
194 
 
12,570 
 
153 
 
12,242 
 
103 
 
12,221 
 
110 
 
Standard errors appear in parentheses.  Each variable is measures as a percentage of total  bank assets.   Each  column of numbers is based upon  failure data for the year indicated at the top of the column and 
on call report data for December 31 of the previous year.  a  Indicates that the means for the surviving and failing groups  are different at the 1.0% level of significance.  b  Indicates that the means for the 
surviving and failing groups are different at the 0.1% level of significance.   c  Commercial real estate loans include nonresidential loans, multifamily loans, and loans for construction and land. 
 
 
Table 3 
Commercial real estate investments as determinants of U.S. bank failures 
 
 
 
1985 
 
1986 
 
1987 
 
1988 
 
Variable 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
Nonresidential 
mortgages 
 
-0.064 a 
(-2.24) 
 
-0.084 b 
(-2.88) 
 
-0.096 c 
(-3.54) 
 
0.013 
(0.71) 
 
0.011 
(0.58) 
 
-0.036 a 
(-1.97) 
 
-0.009 
(-0.64) 
 
-0.022 
(-1.39) 
 
-0.066 c 
(-4.16) 
 
0.035 c 
(3.59) 
 
0.030 a 
(2.52) 
 
0.004 
(0.33) 
 
Loans for land 
and construction 
 
-0.047 
(-1.30) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.027 
(1.42) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.045b 
(3.24) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.040 b 
(2.93) 
 
 
 
 
 
Lag of loans for land  
and construction  d 
 
 
 
0.065 a 
(2.51) 
 
-0.026 
(-0.80) 
 
 
 
0.101 c 
(4.70) 
 
0.013 
(0.46) 
 
 
 
0.091 c 
(7.29) 
 
0.024 
(1.57) 
 
 
 
0.105 c 
(8.74) 
 
0.061 c 
(4.40) 
 
Multifamily 
mortgages 
 
0.090 a 
(2.30) 
 
0.088 a 
(2.05) 
 
-0.031  
(-0.71) 
 
0.066 
(1.36) 
 
0.052 
(0.91) 
 
-0.023 
(-0.35) 
 
0.032 
(0.76) 
 
0.027 
(0.58) 
 
-0.035 
(-0.72) 
 
0.076 c 
(3.67) 
 
0.095 b 
(3.27) 
 
0.043 
(1.30) 
 
Southwestern 
banks 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
New England 
banks 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
Residential 
mortgages 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.056 c 
(-3.69) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.085 c 
(-5.38) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.047 c 
(-4.23) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.025 a 
(-2.28) 
 
Jumbo  
CDS 
 
 
 
 
 
0.015 
(1.77) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.030 c 
(3.36) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.039 c 
(6.05) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.062 c 
(10.25) 
 
Total 
loans 
 
 
 
 
 
0.093 c 
(10.28) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.090 c 
(10.25) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.064 c 
(10.20) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.020 c 
(3.44) 
 
Loans to  
insiders  
 
 
 
 
 
0.084 b 
(2.59) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.036 
(1.57) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.118 c 
(3.91) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.098 a 
(2.41) 
 
Noninterest 
expense 
 
 
 
 
 
0.061 c 
(4.36) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.131 c 
(6.82) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.033 c 
(5.64) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.024 c 
(3.44) 
 
Number of failing banks 
 
110 
 
107 
 
107 
 
135 
 
120 
 
120 
 
195 
 
174 
 
174 
 
203 
 
169 
 
169 
 
Number of surviving banks 
 
14,368 
 
13,535 
 
13,535 
 
14,259 
 
12,787 
 
12,787 
 
13,999 
 
12,935 
 
12,935 
 
13,506 
 
12,279 
 
12,279 
 
Pseudo-R2 
 
0.009 
 
0.012 
 
0.146 
 
0.003 
 
0.014 
 
0.161 
 
0.005 
 
0.020 
 
0.150 
 
0.017 
 
0.044 
 
0.118 
Logistic regression estimates of the probability of failure for FDIC-insured commercial  banks failing during the 1985-1992 period; t-statistics appear in parentheses.  All variables are 
measured as a percentage of total bank assets. For each year, the probability of bank failure is estimated using failure data for that year and call report data for December 31 of the 
preceding year.  Failure data were obtained from FDIC press releases.  Call report data were obtained from the Federal Reserve Board's archival files.  a Indicates significance at the 5.0% 
level.  b Indicates significance at the 1.0% level.  c Indicates significance at the 0.1% level.  d  The lagged values of loans for construction and land are taken from the December 1981 call 
report for 1986 failures, from the December 1983 call report for 1985 and 1986 failures, and from the December 1984 call report for 1988 failures. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 (continued) 
Commercial real estate investments as determinants of U.S. bank failures 
 
 
 
1989 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
Variable 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
Nonresidential 
mortgages 
 
0.062 c 
(7.05) 
 
0.058 c 
(5.80) 
 
0.040 c 
(3.61) 
 
0.055 c 
(5.69) 
 
0.060 c 
(5.45) 
 
0.046 c 
(3.85) 
 
0.082 c 
(8.60) 
 
0.081 c 
(7.29) 
 
0.058 c 
(4.77) 
 
0.052 c 
(4.98) 
 
0.046 c 
(3.67) 
 
0.033 a 
(2.47) 
 
Loans for land 
and construction 
 
0.039 b 
(2.83) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.047 c 
(3.46) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.045 b 
(2.61) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.064 c 
(3.73) 
 
 
 
 
 
Loans for land  
and construction, lagged  d 
 
 
 
0.122 c 
(12.29) 
 
0.093 c 
(8.74) 
 
 
 
0.058 c 
(8.53) 
 
0.088 c 
(7.10) 
 
 
 
0.082 c 
(4.92) 
 
0.072 c 
(4.00) 
 
 
 
0.098 c 
(5.77) 
 
0.083 c 
(4.67) 
 
Multifamily 
mortgages 
 
0.004 
(0.09) 
 
-0.004 
(-0.07) 
 
-0.063  
(-0.91) 
 
0.017 
(0.37) 
 
0.053 
(1.05) 
 
0.019 
(0.33) 
 
0.044 
(1.37) 
 
0.056 
(1.10) 
 
0.034 
(0.66) 
 
0.068 
(1.68) 
 
0.063 
(1.11) 
 
0.043 
(0.73) 
 
Southwestern 
banks 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
New England 
banks 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
0.000 * 
(0.00) 
 
Residential 
mortgages 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.012 
(-1.12) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.016 
(-1.41) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.003 
(-0.28) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.034 a 
(-2.31) 
 
Jumbo  
CDS 
 
 
 
 
 
0.083 c 
(12.25) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.032 b 
(3.11) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.011 
(-0.66) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.043 b 
(3.00) 
 
Total 
loans 
 
 
 
 
 
0.014 a 
(2.32) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.021 b 
(2.76) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.039 c 
(3.77) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.019 a 
(2.03) 
 
Insider  
loans 
 
 
 
 
 
0.045 
(1.17) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.192 c 
(4.72) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.252 c 
(4.17) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.139 
(-0.96) 
 
Noninterest 
expense 
 
 
 
 
 
0.037 c 
(3.35) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.048 c 
(6.11) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.033 c 
(3.82) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.024 c 
(3.51) 
 
Number of failing banks 
 
194 
 
178 
 
178 
 
153 
 
130 
 
130 
 
103 
 
84 
 
84 
 
94 
 
74 
 
74 
 
Number of surviving banks 
 
12,938 
 
11,896 
 
11,896 
 
12,570 
 
11,380 
 
11,380 
 
12,242 
 
11,207 
 
11,207 
 
11,815 
 
10,744 
 
10,744 
 
Pseudo-R2 
 
0.028 
 
0.094 
 
0.185 
 
0.027 
 
0.070 
 
0.115 
 
0.069 
 
0.085 
 
0.118 
 
0.040 
 
0.054 
 
0.081 
 
NOTES:  Logistic regression estimates of the probability of failure for FDIC-insured commercial  banks failing during the 1985-1992 period; t-statistics appear in parentheses.  All 
variables are measured as a percentage of total bank assets. For each year, the probability of bank failure is estimated using failure data for that year and call report data for December 31 
of the preceding year.  Failure data were obtained from FDIC press releases.  Call report data were obtained from the Federal Reserve Board's archival files.  a Indicates significance at 
the 5.0% level.  b Indicates significance at the 1.0% level.  c Indicates significance at the 0.1% level.   d  The lagged values of loans for construction and land are taken from the December 
1984 call report for 1989 and 1990 failure, and from the December 1985 call report for 1991 and 1992 failures.  
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Table 4 
Commercial real estate investments as determinants of Southwestern bank failures 
 
 
 
1985 
 
1986 
 
1987 
 
1988 
 
Variable 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
Nonresidential 
mortgages 
 
-0.064 a 
(-2.24) 
 
-0.084 b 
(-2.88) 
 
-0.096 c 
(-3.54) 
 
0.013 
(0.71) 
 
0.011 
(0.58) 
 
-0.036 a 
(-1.97) 
 
-0.009 
(-0.64) 
 
-0.022 
(-1.39) 
 
-0.066 c 
(-4.16) 
 
0.035 c 
(3.59) 
 
0.030 a 
(2.52) 
 
0.004 
(0.33) 
 
Loans for land 
and construction 
 
-0.047 
(-1.30) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.027 
(1.42) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.045b 
(3.24) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.040 b 
(2.93) 
 
 
 
 
 
Lag of loans for land  
and construction  d 
 
 
 
0.065 a 
(2.51) 
 
-0.026 
(-0.80) 
 
 
 
0.101 c 
(4.70) 
 
0.013 
(0.46) 
 
 
 
0.091 c 
(7.29) 
 
0.024 
(1.57) 
 
 
 
0.105 c 
(8.74) 
 
0.061 c 
(4.40) 
 
Multifamily 
mortgages 
 
0.090 a 
(2.30) 
 
0.088 a 
(2.05) 
 
-0.031  
(-0.71) 
 
0.066 
(1.36) 
 
0.052 
(0.91) 
 
-0.023 
(-0.35) 
 
0.032 
(0.76) 
 
0.027 
(0.58) 
 
-0.035 
(-0.72) 
 
0.076 c 
(3.67) 
 
0.095 b 
(3.27) 
 
0.043 
(1.30) 
 
Residential 
mortgages 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.056 c 
(-3.69) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.085 c 
(-5.38) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.047 c 
(-4.23) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.025 a 
(-2.28) 
 
Jumbo  
CDS 
 
 
 
 
 
0.015 
(1.77) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.030 c 
(3.36) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.039 c 
(6.05) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.062 c 
(10.25) 
 
Total 
loans 
 
 
 
 
 
0.093 c 
(10.28) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.090 c 
(10.25) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.064 c 
(10.20) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.020 c 
(3.44) 
 
Loans to  
insiders  
 
 
 
 
 
0.084 b 
(2.59) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.036 
(1.57) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.118 c 
(3.91) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.098 a 
(2.41) 
 
Noninterest 
expense 
 
 
 
 
 
0.061 c 
(4.36) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.131 c 
(6.82) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.033 c 
(5.64) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.024 c 
(3.44) 
 
Number of failing banks 
 
110 
 
107 
 
107 
 
135 
 
120 
 
120 
 
195 
 
174 
 
174 
 
203 
 
169 
 
169 
 
Number of surviving banks 
 
14,368 
 
13,535 
 
13,535 
 
14,259 
 
12,787 
 
12,787 
 
13,999 
 
12,935 
 
12,935 
 
13,506 
 
12,279 
 
12,279 
 
Pseudo-R2 
 
0.009 
 
0.012 
 
0.146 
 
0.003 
 
0.014 
 
0.161 
 
0.005 
 
0.020 
 
0.150 
 
0.017 
 
0.044 
 
0.118 
 
Logistic regression estimates of the probability of failure for FDIC-insured commercial  banks failing during the 1985-1992 period; t-statistics appear in parentheses.  All variables are 
measured as a percentage of total bank assets. For each year, the probability of bank failure is estimated using failure data for that year and call report data for December 31 of the 
preceding year.  Failure data were obtained from FDIC press releases.  Call report data were obtained from the Federal Reserve Board's archival files.  a Indicates significance at the 5.0% 
level.  b Indicates significance at the 1.0% level.  c Indicates significance at the 0.1% level.  d  The lagged values of loans for construction and land are taken from the December 1981 call 
report for 1986 failures, from the December 1983 call report for 1985 and 1986 failures, and from the December 1984 call report for 1988 failures. 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Commercial real estate investments as determinants of Southwestern bank failures 
 
 
 
1989 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
Variable 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
Nonresidential 
mortgages 
 
0.062 c 
(7.05) 
 
0.058 c 
(5.80) 
 
0.040 c 
(3.61) 
 
0.055 c 
(5.69) 
 
0.060 c 
(5.45) 
 
0.046 c 
(3.85) 
 
0.082 c 
(8.60) 
 
0.081 c 
(7.29) 
 
0.058 c 
(4.77) 
 
0.052 c 
(4.98) 
 
0.046 c 
(3.67) 
 
0.033 a 
(2.47) 
 
Loans for land 
and construction 
 
0.039 b 
(2.83) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.047 c 
(3.46) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.045 b 
(2.61) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.064 c 
(3.73) 
 
 
 
 
 
Loans for land  
and construction, lagged  d 
 
 
 
0.122 c 
(12.29) 
 
0.093 c 
(8.74) 
 
 
 
0.058 c 
(8.53) 
 
0.088 c 
(7.10) 
 
 
 
0.082 c 
(4.92) 
 
0.072 c 
(4.00) 
 
 
 
0.098 c 
(5.77) 
 
0.083 c 
(4.67) 
 
Multifamily 
mortgages 
 
0.004 
(0.09) 
 
-0.004 
(-0.07) 
 
-0.063  
(-0.91) 
 
0.017 
(0.37) 
 
0.053 
(1.05) 
 
0.019 
(0.33) 
 
0.044 
(1.37) 
 
0.056 
(1.10) 
 
0.034 
(0.66) 
 
0.068 
(1.68) 
 
0.063 
(1.11) 
 
0.043 
(0.73) 
 
Residential 
mortgages 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.012 
(-1.12) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.016 
(-1.41) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.003 
(-0.28) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.034 a 
(-2.31) 
 
Jumbo  
CDS 
 
 
 
 
 
0.083 c 
(12.25) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.032 b 
(3.11) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.011 
(-0.66) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.043 b 
(3.00) 
 
Total 
loans 
 
 
 
 
 
0.014 a 
(2.32) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.021 b 
(2.76) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.039 c 
(3.77) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.019 a 
(2.03) 
 
Insider  
loans 
 
 
 
 
 
0.045 
(1.17) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.192 c 
(4.72) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.252 c 
(4.17) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.139 
(-0.96) 
 
Noninterest 
expense 
 
 
 
 
 
0.037 c 
(3.35) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.048 c 
(6.11) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.033 c 
(3.82) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.024 c 
(3.51) 
 
Number of failing banks 
 
194 
 
178 
 
178 
 
153 
 
130 
 
130 
 
103 
 
84 
 
84 
 
94 
 
74 
 
74 
 
Number of surviving banks 
 
12,938 
 
11,896 
 
11,896 
 
12,570 
 
11,380 
 
11,380 
 
12,242 
 
11,207 
 
11,207 
 
11,815 
 
10,744 
 
10,744 
 
Pseudo-R2 
 
0.028 
 
0.094 
 
0.185 
 
0.027 
 
0.070 
 
0.115 
 
0.069 
 
0.085 
 
0.118 
 
0.040 
 
0.054 
 
0.081 
 
NOTES:  Logistic regression estimates of the probability of failure for FDIC-insured commercial  banks failing during the 1985-1992 period; t-statistics appear in parentheses.  All 
variables are measured as a percentage of total bank assets. For each year, the probability of bank failure is estimated using failure data for that year and call report data for December 31 
of the preceding year.  Failure data were obtained from FDIC press releases.  Call report data were obtained from the Federal Reserve Board's archival files.  a Indicates significance at 
the 5.0% level.  b Indicates significance at the 1.0% level.  c Indicates significance at the 0.1% level.   d  The lagged values of loans for construction and land are taken from the December 
1984 call report for 1989 and 1990 failure, and from the December 1985 call report for 1991 and 1992 failures.  
 
